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AT -WILL EMPLOYMENT AND THE HANDSOME AMERICAN: 
A CASE STUDY IN LAW AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Theodore J. St. Antoine• 
I. Introduction 
For a man as youthful and vibrant as Ben Aaron, it must come as a somewhat 
chilling realization that he is now, in the considered judgment of his peers, the 
reigning dean of American labor law scholars. At the initiation of this series last 
year, one of our most distinguished federal appellate judges, Harry Edwards, who to 
the best of my knowledge has never studied or worked extensively with Ben, 
nonetheless pronounced Ben one of the four "heroes" whom he sought to emulate in his 
own work.1 Whether it be the Industrial Relations Research Association or the 
National Academy of Arbitrators on the domestic scene, or the International Society 
for Labor Law and Social Security on the worldwide scene, whenever academics and 
practitioners in the employment field want a leader who will be a master of both 
theory and practice, it is Ben Aaron whom they elect to head their organizations. And 
for all of us who toil in the vineyard of industrial relations, it is Ben Aaron who so 
often sets the agenda -- just as he did in his magisterial inaugural lecture right here a 
year ago. 
At that time Ben outlined "two problems of immediate urgency" that he felt had 
to be addressed, namely, plant closings and wrongful discharge.2 Now, it would take a 
more intrepid spirit than I to tackle the first topic, at least in Ben Aaron's own 
backyard. Ben has already done that subject to a fare-thee-wel1.8 Besides, it appears 
that in the meantime the U.S. Congress may have got the message.• So tonight I shall 
• James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I wish to 
acknowledge the imaginative research assistance of Gregg Gilman and Claire Mercurio, 
especially in collecting pertinent sociopsychological references. 
deal with unjust dismissal, where the changes in legal doctrine surely constitute the 
most important development in the whole field of employment law during the past 
decade. I am more honored than I can say by this opportunity to cover one of the 
items on Ben's agenda. 
Before proceeding, however, I should like to add a personal word. Ben is more 
than a highly esteemed professional colleague. I am proud to count myself among 
Ben's and his wife Eleanor's globe-girdling contingent of friends and acquaintances. To 
be a recipient of their hospitality is to experience something akin to Old World warmth 
and graciousness. Both of them are bon vivants in the very best sense, and their 
enthusiasm for sharing their pleasures and discoveries has enriched the lives of many 
of us. I can only hope my presentation this evening will serve as a small token of my 
regard for this splendid pair. I might add that last year, with typical modesty but 
uncharacteristic inaccuracy, Ben remarked that he was looking forward to seeing "abler 
and more distinguished scholars"5 succeeding him in this series. I am confident that I 
speak for many of those lecturers when I say that we shall be more than satisfied if 
our contributions come close to meeting the high standards set by Ben Aaron. 
The past decade has seen a genuine revolution in employment law, as some forty 
American jurisdictions, in square holdings or strong dictum and on one or more diverse 
theories, have modified the conventional doctrine whereby employers "may dismiss their 
employees at will ... for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong."6 
In this paper I shall briefly review the theories most frequently invoked by the courts 
in dealing with wrongful dismissal and indicate their deficiencies as a permanent 
solution for the problem. Next, I shall summarize the major arguments for and against 
the doctrine of employment at will. Finally, I shall consider some of the particular 
issues that will have to be resolved in any proposed legislation. But first, to view the 
whole question from a somewhat different perspective, I should like to look at a few 
sociopsychological factors that may help explain why the United States remains today 
the last major industrial democracy in the world without generalized "just cause" 
protections for its workers. 
II. Social Psychology and the Handsome American 
Americans are known as a generous and caring people. If a natural disaster 
occurs in India or Latin America, Americans can be counted on to rally around with 
medical supplies and open pocketbooks. We take such compassionate impulses almost 
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for granted; they go along with our image of ourselves as the perennial good guys, as 
nature's noblemen. But there may be some darker shadows in the picture. On 
occasion, condescending or patronizing attitudes may accompany our proffered aid. In 
the late 1950s William Lederer and Eugene Burdick wrote a novel about this country's 
involvement in Southeast Asia that introduced a new phrase into popular usage -- "The 
Ugly American."7 Significantly, for most persons, the term became shorthand for any 
oafish, uncouth, irresponsible citizen abroad. Our predisposition to regard the normal 
cleancut American as the very embodiment of virtue blinded us to other possibilities. 
In fact, the original ugly American was one of the heroes of the Lederer-Burdick book. 
He spent his time out in the rice paddies helping the natives to help themselves. The 
handsome, well-manicured Americans stayed back in their isolated urban compounds, 
drawing up grandiose but unrealistic plans for reshaping the countryside with giant 
dams and sprawling factories. 
Over the last few years I have struggled to reconcile the notion of a caring, 
giving, open-hearted America with the resistance I have frequently encountered, even 
in many traditionally progressive circles, to the concept of universal "just cause" 
safeguards for this country's working persons. The image of Lederer and Burdick's 
"handsome" Americans, who operated apart from the people they were purporting to 
assist, and in ignorance of their real wants and needs, led me to indulge in some 
amateur psychologizing about the more appealing and enduring mythic figures of our 
history, and the lessons they might impart about our national character. I discovered 
that two of my own candidates as prototypical icons -- the self-sufficient frontiersman 
and the hard-boiled private eye, two quintessential "loners" have been taken quite 
seriously as national symbols in one of the most influential of recent sociological 
works, Habits of the Heart.8 The authors draw on such figures from an earlier era as 
James Fenimore Cooper's Deerslayer, the Lone Ranger, and the beleaguered sheriff in 
High Noon, and such solitary modern heroes as the detectives Sam Spade, Philip 
Marlowe, and Lew Archer to illustrate a central thesis of their book: "Individualism 
lies at the very core of American culture."9 It is, however, an ambivalent 
individualism, for it involves, as these scholars describe it, "a commitment to the equal 
right to dignity of every individual combined with an effort to justify inequality of 
reward, which, when extreme, may deprive people of dignity."10 
At its best, individualism produces Lederer and Burdick's ugly but achieving and 
sharing American; at its worst, as a host of sociologists and psychologists have 
demonstrated, excessive emphasis on personal responsibility can result in self -loathing 
3 
by the moderately successful and a "blaming of the victim" for his or her economic or 
social woes.11 Having failures around to identify and derogate may even be a way for 
the relatively unsuccessful to justify and console themselves.12 An overly 
individualistic society is harsh and unforgiving. Failure is invariably attributed to 
personal fault and almost never to socioeconomic forces that may often be beyond 
one's control. In such a dog-eat-dog milieu, it will not be easy for the fired worker 
to generate much sympathy for his claims of unjust treatment. 
The centrality if not primacy of individualism in American life is hardly a new 
discovery. As early as the 1830s Tocqueville analyzed the phenomenon, but he gave it 
only the worst of possible connotations: "Individualism . . . disposes each citizen to 
isolate himself from the mass of his fellows . . . . All a man's interests are limited to 
those near himself."13 In his classic 1893 essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in 
American History," Frederick Jackson Turner declared that it is "to the frontier that 
American intellect owes its striking characteristics," including "that dominant 
individualism, working for good and for eviJ."14 In that prophetic work, An American 
Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal commented on the "low degree of law observance" in the 
United States, noting that the "authorities . . . will most often meet the citizen's 
individualistic inclinations by trying to educate him to obey the law less in terms of 
collective interest than in terms of self-interest."15 
The national psyches of Western Europe and especially of the Orient plainly differ 
from ours, stressing interdependence over rugged individualism. Thus, psychiatrist Irvin 
Yalom contrasts Europe's "geographic and ethnic confinement, the greater familiarity 
with limits, war, death, and uncertain existence," with America's "expansiveness, 
optimism, limitless horizons, and pragmatism."16 Social psychologists point out that 
training for independence begins earlier in the West, particularly in the United States, 
than in non-Western societies.17 In Japan, specifically, "mature interdependence is 
defined in terms of reciprocal responsibilities," so that an employee's "loyalty to the 
firm is quite compatible with self-actualization."18 
The American brand of individualism is obviously not all bad. It accounts in part 
for those peculiar national traits of self-reliance, inventiveness, and sheer exuberance 
that have frequently been the envy of the world. And at widely separated but perhaps 
equally critical stages in our history, as Tocqueville19 and Myrdal20 have observed, the 
higher values of democracy -- such as political freedom and a concern for the public 
welfare -- have prevailed over the grosser excesses of individualism. Perhaps it is not 
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too quixotic to hope that, given sufficient time for education and reflection , Americans 
will appropriately reorder their values concerning the issue of employment at will. 
III. Judicial Theories of Unjust Discharge 
Let me now turn to a brief overview of the three principal theories employed by 
the courts to modify the at-will employment doctrine, along with my reasons for 
believing these theories are ultimately inadequate for the task. The three theories 
include tort -- violation of public policy, or "abusive" discharge; breach of an express 
or implied contract; and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
A. Tort Theories 
The courts have acted along a spectrum of public policy violations. At one 
extreme end employers have actually fired employees for refusing to commit a crime, 
such as perjury21 or price-fixing.22 I should like to think that we are past the point 
when any court would countenance such an outrage. Nexf along the spectrum are 
cases where employees are discharged for performing a public duty, like serving on a 
jury23 or "blowing the whistle" on wrongdoing within a company.2" Lastly, there are 
dismissals for exercising a public right, such as filing a workers' compensation claim.25 
The first type of case, where criminal conduct is importuned, is going to be easy, 
and also extremely rare. After that, the issues will get tougher for the courts. 
"Public policy" is a slippery concept. For example, it may be one thing if a 
"whis.tleblower" has been subpoened to appear at an official inquiry. It may be quite 
another if he has taken it upon himself to share his good-faith but mistaken suspicions 
with the media, seriously damaging his employer's reputation. Some courts have simply 
thrown up their hands over public policy claims, insisting such matters should be left 
to the legislature. 26 Except in the most egregious situations, therefore, judicial 
theories of public policy are no sure answer to the problem of unfair dismissal. 
Even more nebulous is the notion of "abusive" discharge. One celebrated decision 
sustained a suit by a female worker who was fired for refusing to date her foreman. 27 
Other courts, however, have declined to remedy such personal abuse.28 Moreover, 
there is a growing tendency to require that the public policy relied upon be "clearly 
articulated" and "well accepted,"29 or even that it be "evidenced by a constitutional or 
statutory provision."80 That will give small comfort to most employees who are 
discharged spitefully or arbitrarily. 
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B. Contract Theories 
At one time an employer's oral assurance of "permanent" employment, or a policy 
statement in a personnel manual that employees would be discharged only for just 
cause, was not considered legally binding.31 In the early 1980s, however, a number of 
courts began taking employers at their word, and started treating such declarations as 
express or implied contracts.32 But many courts continued to regard these employer 
statements as merely nonbinding expressions of present intent.33 Furthermore, 
individual promises of job security will probably be given only to higher-ranking 
personnel, and only the more enlightened employers are likely to issue protective 
policies applicable to employees generally. Thus, the person who undoubtedly needs 
these safeguards the most -- the rank-and-file worker in the marginal establishment --
is the very one who will get the least. 
Even where courts recognize the new contractual qualification on employment at 
will, an employer can of course avoid liability by refraining from any assurances.34 
Clear and prominent disclaimers of any legal intent in an employee handbook will also 
accomplish the purpose.36 Although it is more problematical, I also believe an 
employer can ordinarily purge a manual of any guarantees against future terminations, 
even as to incumbent employees.36 After all, one would not consider an employer 
stuck forever with an existing, unilaterally established pay scale, even if economic 
conditions worsened dramatically. 
principle seem no panacea, either. 
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
In short, the contract exceptions to the at-will 
Massachusetts and California have led the way in developing the most expansive 
judicial qualification of the employment-at-will doctrine. This modification is based on 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is said to inhere in every contract. 
"Bad faith" has been found when a jury concluded an employer had dismissed an 
employee to avoid paying him the full commission due on a multimillion-dollar sale,37 
and when an employer discharged a long-term employee without good cause.38 This 
novel use of the good faith concept appears contrary to its traditional function. It 
has not been regarded as applicable to contract termination as such, but rather to the 
mutual obligation of the parties not to interfere with each other's performance or their 
receipt of the benefits of the agreement.89 My judgment is that most courts will 
follow the New York Court of Appeals40 in rejecting the good-faith covenant in this 
context as fundamentally incompatible with the whole theory of at-will employment. 
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IV. The Case for Just Cause Legislation 
About 60 million persons work in private sector, nonunion firms in the United 
States, and thus are not protected against unjust dismissal by either collective 
bargaining agreements or constitutional or civil service provisions. A careful scholar 
has estimated that of this group, some two million nonprobationary employees are 
discharged annually. He further calculates that about J 50,000 of these would be 
restored to their jobs if they had the same just cause protections as unionized 
workers.41 The problem is a substantial one, then, in terms of the numbers alone. 
The courts of the more progressive states, like California, Massachusetts, and 
Michigan, have probably neared the limits of their willingness to modify at-will 
employment. They will entertain suits alleging serious violations of accepted public 
policy. They will hold employers to their unretracted word not to fire except for good 
reason. But ordinarily they will not impose an affirmative obligation on employers to 
prove just cause to support a discharge. The next move therefore seems up to the 
legislatures. 
Conceptually, there appears little or nothing to be said in favor of an employer's 
right to treat its employees arbitrarily or unfairly. For most commentators, it is a 
matter of simple justice.42 Perhaps the most outspoken academic dissenter is Professor 
Richard Epstein of Chicago. He views at-will contracts as fair because they are the 
product of freedom of contract between parties with equal bargaining power seeking a 
mutually beneficial relationship.43 He even suggests that workers will profit from "risk 
diversi.fication," since the contract at will offsets "the concentration of individual 
investment in a single job."44 The Epstein thesis exudes the rarefied ozone of the 
ivory tower, not the rank air of the plant floor. His analysis admits of no living, 
breathing human beings, who develop irrational antagonisms or exercise poor judgment, 
on the one hand, or who suffer the psychological as well as the economic devastation 
of losing a job, on the other. Numerops studies document the increases in 
cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdow.Qs, alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes, spouse 
and child abuse, impair_ed social relationships, and various other diseases and 
abnormalities that develop even in the wake of impersonal permanent layoffs resulting 
from plant closings.45 Presumably such effects are at least as severe when a worker 
is singled out to be discharged for some alleged incompetence or rule infraction. Even 
if Epstein were correct in all his statements about employees collectively, this searing 
harm to individuals would stm justify eradicating the at-will principle. 
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This reform will probably come at some cost. Many persons will naturally think 
of the employer's loss of flexibility in its operations, and the need for extra staff in 
the personnel office. That will almost surely be a piece of the story, but it may not 
be the whole by any means. One scholar has suggested a lower wage level could result 
because the more stable and attractive employment situation would cause both a 
decrease in the demand for labor and an increase in the supply.46 In effect, the 
employees themselves would pay at least partially for their greater job security. That 
is a time-honored tradeoff among unionized workers,47 however, and should not be 
considered inappropriate here. There is also evidence that the net increase in 
employers' costs in maintaining a for-cause discharge system would not be exorbitant. 
For example, in all the demands by unionized firms for "givebacks" or bargaining 
concessions during the early 1980s, scarcely ever did employers seek to remove "just 
cause" contract clauses, or the grievance and arbitration procedures to enforce them. 
The "competitiveness" of American business in international markets should not be 
markedly affected by the elimination of at-will employment. Statutory protection 
against unfair discharge now exists in about sixty countries around the world, including 
all of the Common Market, Sweden and Norway, Japan, and Canada.48 We are the last 
major holdout against the recommendations of the International Labor Organization in 
1963 and again in 1982 that workers not be terminated except for a valid reason. 
Furthermore, experience both here and abroad suggests that the prevention of arbitrary 
treatment of employees may be good business as well as humane. Significant 
correlations have been shown between a secure work force and high productivity and 
quality output.49 
A more rational, systematic method of dealing with wrongful terminations would 
save many employers the crushing financial liability imposed by emotionally aroused 
juries under our existing, capricious common-law regime. For example, separate studies 
at different times by a plaintifrs attorney50 and a management attorney51 in California 
indicated that plaintiffs won between 78 and 90 percent of the cases that went to 
juries, with the awards averaging between $425,000 and $450,000. Jury awards for 
single individuals have gone as high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, and $2.57 
million.62 Eventually, an informed employer lobby might well conclude that 
comprehensive just cause legislation, which would exclude jury verdicts and punitive 
damages, was the more favorable alternative. 
There are signs, indeed, of some movement, glacial though it is. Bills forbidding 
wrongful discharge have been introduced in a dozen or more legislatures.58 In addition 
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to the positive recommendations of the special committee of the California Bar's Labor 
and Employment Law Section, 54 the individual rights committee of the ABA Section on 
Labor and Employment Law has drafted a questionnaire regarding the critical issues to 
be considered in any proposed law.65 The AFL-CIO's Executive Council has ended 
organized labor's longstanding ambivalence on the subject by endorsing the concept of 
wrongful discharge legislation.66 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have 
decided to draft a model statute. And this past summer Montana became the first 
state to adopt a comprehensive law protecting employees against unjust discharge.67 
V. Statutory Proposals 
Ben Aaron himself has provided us with a road map of the subjects that must be 
covered in writing legislation to deal with wrongful termination.68 With a few minor 
detours, I shaH be happy to follow his directions. Ideally, we should probably have a 
uniform federal law. But the political climate is such that legislation in some of the 
more receptive states seems the most feasible course for the foreseeable future. 
A. Coverage 
In the higher ranges of management, one official's evaluation of another's 
business judgment may become so intertwined with questions of fair treatment that the 
two cannot be separated. These top executives should be excluded from coverage. On 
the other hand, shop foremen and supervisors who are not protected by the National 
Labor Relations Act because they are management's representatives with rank-and-file 
employees do not present such potential conflicts of interest under just cause 
safeguards, and should be covered. Several proposed bills draw the line by excepting 
persons entitled to a pension above a certain amount, or persons with a fixed-term 
contract of two years or more. Probationary employees may also be excluded. Six 
months is a common probation period but a California bill specifies two years.69 That 
is the sort of quantitative issue which lends itself to compromise. 
Small employers may be more prone to arbitrariness and individual spite than 
large, structured corporations. But we hesitate to intrude into the sometimes intensely 
personal relationships of tiny establishments. A suitable dividing line, at least at the 
outset, would seem to be employers having between ten60 and fifteen61 or more 
employees. 
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Public employees generally have constitutional guarantees against the deprivation 
of their "vested" job interests without due process. About half also have more specific 
civil service or tenure protections against unjust dismissal. It would seem sensible to 
adopt the approach of several bills in limiting new protections to private industry. 
I see no principled grounds for treating organized employees differently from the 
unorganized with respect to basic statutory safeguards. If workers in general are 
entitled to invoke a just cause standard, the same public policy should arguably apply 
to all, regardless of the existence of parallel protections in collective bargaining 
agreements. Federal precedent for such an approach exists in both the NLRA and civil 
rights legislation. Nonetheless, there would be federal preemption problems with state 
laws,62 and procedural problems in accommodating contractual and statutory rights.63 
There may be much practical wisdom in the solution of several bills to finesse all these 
complications by excluding unionized employees. 
B. Standard Applicable and Discipline Affected 
My proposal would be to articulate a standard for discharge or discipline in terms 
of "just cause" or equivalent language, without further definition but perhaps with a 
few illustrative reasons. Even in Western Europe, which had nothing like the body of 
American arbitral precedent to draw upon, there has apparently been little difficulty in 
applying broadly phrased statutory criteria. Any effort at specificity is bound to risk 
under inclusiveness. 
have our arbitrators. 
Decisionmakers should be able to flesh out "just cause" much as 
Outright discharge, the so-called "capital punishment" of industrial relations, is 
the usual target of all these proposals. But an extended suspension, a demotion, or an 
onerous job assignment can be almost as bad. Yet we shrink from subjecting every 
shop discipline to governmental review. The solution of several bills is to cover 
"constructive" discharge as weu.s.t An employee who feels sufficiently aggrieved may 
quit, and then test the legitimacy of the employer conduct that triggered his or her 
departure. 
C. Enforcement Procedures 
Administration and enforcement of new just cause legislation will have to be 
lodged in the courts, or in existing or newly created executive departments or 
administrative agencies. I would join most persons in ruling out the courts as too 
formal, too costly, and too slow. Beyond that, I think the locus of administration is 
10 
less significant than whether we follow the hearing officer-agency model or the 
arbitration model. With a unanimity rare among their contentious tribe, those 
arbitrators confronting the issue have invariably opted for arbitration. I go along with 
my colleagues. I like to think our dockets are already so bulging that we could not 
possibly be impelled by crass commercial considerations; I do believe there are valid, 
objective reasons for our choice. 
The arbitration format would immediately make available the vast body of arbitral 
precedent concerning substance and procedure that has been developed in countless 
decisions over the years. It would permit the use of an established nucleus of 
experienced arbitrators, and of the growing number of young, able aspirants who 
Robben Fleming demonstrated some years ago are objectively qualified to render 
acceptable decisions, especially in the more straightforward disciplinary cases. 65 
Arbitration would facilitate maximum flexibHity, at least until more is learned about 
future caseloads, because there would be no need to engage a large permanent staff at 
the beginning. The relative informality and speed of arbitration -- though both of 
those qualities are too often much eroded -- should also appeal to rank-and-file 
employees. One drawback of arbitration for employees, however, might be that, in 
keeping with the pattern in the unionized sector, and in recognition of the strained 
financial resources of most states, the parties themselves would have to bear the cost 
of the arbitrator. 
It would seem highly desirable to have some screening mechanism in the statutory 
procedure to avoid a flood of hearings. The most obvious would be a preliminary 
mediation stage of minimum duration, as provided by California and Michigan bills.66 
One knowledgeable observer would have an official in the administering agency make a 
"reasonble cause" determination before a case could go to arbitration.67 Such a 
requirement would be especially appropriate if the state was to bear a major share of 
the cost of the proceedings. The arbitrator's award itself should be final and binding, 
without the need for agency adoption or review as in the case of a hearing officer's 
report or decision. Ordinarily, of course, the courts will not set aside a private 
arbitration award unless the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction or the award was 
obtained by fraud, bribery, or similar means.68 Those criteria ought to apply here. 
D. Remedies 
Remedies for unjust discharge in the United States have traditionally included 
reinstatement, with or without back pay. In Europe reinstatement is the exception. 
11 
Apparently it is felt that future relations between the employer and the unwanted 
employee will be too strained, and that the employee is better off to leave with a flat 
severance payment. A number of American experts also seem to believe that 
reinstatement is unfeasible without the presence of a labor union to support the 
restored employee. I believe an award of severance pay in lieu of reinstatement should 
be an option available to the arbitrator. But I would not preclude reinstatement out of 
excessive solicitude for the employee. A reinstatement order may also furnish extra 
bargaining leverage to the employee in negotiating any future settlement with the 
employer. 
The tradeoff for employers would be the elimination of jury verdicts, 
compensatory and punitive damages, awards for pain and mental suffering, and the like. 
Something rather analogous occurred in the second decade of this century, when 
employers swapped their powerful common law defenses to tortious injury of employees 
in the workplace in return for the no-fault workers' compensation system and its 
denial of compensatory and punitive damages. Despite some occasional creaks in the 
joints, workers' compensation has generally served us well. It may stand as a salutary 
precedent for mutual accommodations in our present deliberations over wrongful 
dismissal. 
VI. Conclusion 
The social psychologists - - and the medical diagnosticians -- are only beginning 
to assess the full meaning of the loss of a job. At least we can now perceive that 
profound values are at stake, not just economic hardship. Beyond the clinically 
observable symptoms of impaired, even shattered, minds and bodies, there is a genuine 
' question of identity involved. Studies have found that "most, if not all, working 
people tend to describe themselves in terms of the work groups or organizations to 
which they belong. The question 'Who are you?' often elicits an organizationally 
related response . Occupational role is usually a part of this response for all 
classes: 'I'm a steelworker,' or 'I'm a lawyer.'"69 To lose one's job is, in a true 
sense, to risk one's very being. 
Rugged individualists though we may be, Americans eventually -- if sometimes 
belatedly -- recognize moral and social imperatives. In my view, reform of wrongful 
termination has now assumed that status, and I am confident we shall respond. But I 
do not expect a widespread response any time soon. It took us some fifty years longer 
12 
than that hardly liberal statesman, Chancellor Bismarck of Germany, to see the need 
for Social Security. On that timetable, counting from the ILO's initial call for just 
cause legislation in 1963, we shall have accomplished the task by the year 2013. I can 
only hope that Ben Aaron and I shall be together then if not in Southern 
California, then in some even airier and more pellucid region 
one of his favorite vintages. And the two of us shall share a toast. 
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and Ben will uncork 
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